|Associate Professor of Finance
Swiss Finance Institute Senior Chair
Email: ruediger.fahlenbrach [at] epfl.ch
Phone: ++41 (0)21 693 0098
Fax: ++41 (0)21 693 0110
Postal: Swiss Finance Institute @ EPFL
Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Extranef 211
CH – 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
RUEDIGER FAHLENBRACH is Swiss Finance Institute Associate Professor at Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland. He holds a senior chair from the Swiss Finance Institute. Formerly on the faculty of the Fisher College of Business of the Ohio State University (USA), he received a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of Pennsylvania (Wharton).
He has research interests in empirical corporate finance, in particular corporate governance and entrepreneurship. Ruediger Fahlenbrach has published in the leading academic journals in finance, including the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Review of Financial Studies and the Review of Finance.
He is Associate Editor of the Review of Finance and former Associate Editor of the Review of Financial Studies (2013-2016) and Financial Management (2012-2016). Ruediger has been elected director of the European Finance Association, for a three year term (2018-2020). He is a research member of the European Corporate Governance Institute.
His research has been reported in many large-circulation newspapers such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Le Temps, NZZ, Handelsblatt, Forbes Magazine, USA Today, and Fortune Magazine.
Ruediger has been honored with more than a dozen teaching awards. He regularly teaches executive education classes.
Link to a recent Curriculum Vitae
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Robert Prilmeier, and René M. Stulz, 2018, Why Does Fast Loan Growth Predict Poor Performance for Banks?, Review of Financial Studies 31, 1014-1063.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Angie Low, and René M. Stulz, 2017, Do Independent Director Departures Predict Future Bad Events?, Review of Financial Studies 30, 2313-2358.
Schmidt, Cornelius, and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2017, Do exogeneous changes in passive institutional ownership affect corporate governance and firm value?, Journal of Financial Economics 124, 285-306.
Boyson, Nicole, Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, and René M. Stulz, 2016, Why Don’t all Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust-preferred Securities, Review of Financial Studies 29, 1821-1859.
Cronqvist, Henrik, and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2013, CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?, Journal of Financial Economics 108, 659-674.
Evans, Richard B., and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2012, Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance: Evidence from Retail – Institutional Fund Twins, Review of Financial Studies 25, 3530-3571.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Robert Prilmeier, and René M. Stulz, 2012, This Time is the Same: Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance During the Recent Financial Crisis, Journal of Finance 67, 2139-2185.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, and René M. Stulz, 2011, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 99, 11-26.
Becker, Bo, Henrik Cronqvist, and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2011, Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, 907-942.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Bernadette Minton, and Carrie Pan, 2011, Former CEO Directors: Lingering CEOs or Valuable Resources?, Review of Financial Studies 24, 3486-3518.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Angie Low, and René M. Stulz, 2010, Why Do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors?, Journal of Financial Economics 97, 12-32.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, and Patrik V. Sandås, 2010, Does Information Drive Trading in Option Strategies?, Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 2370-2385.
Cronqvist, Henrik, and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, 2009, Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies, Review of Financial Studies 22, 3941-3976.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, and René M. Stulz, 2009, Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 342-361.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2009, Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 439-466.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2009, Shareholder Rights, Boards, and Executive Compensation, Review of Finance 13, 81-113.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, and Patrik V. Sandås, 2009, Co-movements of Index Options and Futures Quotes, Journal of Empirical Finance 16, 151-163.
Dlugosz, Jennifer, Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Gompers, Paul, and Andrew Metrick, 2006, Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement, Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 594-618.
Please find the newest versions of my working papers here
Fabisik, Kornelia, Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, René M. Stulz, and Jerome P. Taillard, 2018, Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less?
Abstract: Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm’s Tobin’s q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our findings are consistent with the literature, showing that there is an increasing and concave relation between q and managerial ownership. We show that these seemingly contradictory results are explained by cumulative past performance and liquidity. Better performing firms have more liquid equity, which enables insiders to more easily sell shares after the IPO, and they also have a higher Tobin’s q. (JEL G30, G32)
Efing, Matthias, Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Christoph Herpfer, and Philipp Krueger, 2018, How do investors and firms react to an unexpected currency appreciation shock?
Abstract: We examine the impact of a large, sudden, and unexpected home currency appreciation shock on the valuation and behavior of corporations in a developed economy. The Swiss National Bank surprisingly repealed a minimum exchange rate of 1.2 Swiss francs per Euro on January 15, 2015, triggering a one day appreciation of 18 percent. The market value of Swiss firms, in particular exporters, fell substantially on the event day. The appreciation also caused a substantial decrease in sales among currency exposed firms in the following 6 months. Firms stabilized sales by making price concessions which compressed margins and return on assets for the years to follow. They also reduced investment by an economically large 8.3 percentage points.
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Hyemin Kim, and Angie Low, 2017, The importance of network recommendations in the director labor market.
Abstract: Directors are more likely to obtain additional directorships or be promoted if the CEO and peer directors of their current board are well-connected. The impact of CEO and peer director connections is stronger for additional appointments and promotions at firms in the CEO’s and peer directors’ networks. CEO connections are particularly important for directors with a weaker labor market. There is no evidence that the appointments of referred directors are less well-received by the market than other appointments. Overall, connections are important in the director labor market. Access to additional networks provides strong incentives for directors to join corporate boards. (JEL G30, G34)
Teaching in the EPFL MFE Program
Introduction to Finance
EPFL EMBA Program (Principles of Finance)
IMD Lausanne (Strategic Finance)
Swiss Finance Institute (Venture Capital and private equity; Impact investing)
Teaching in the SFI Ph.D. Program
Empirical Corporate Finance
Teaching in other Ph.D. Programs
Vienna Graduate School of Finance
Central-German Doctoral Program Economics