Agency conflicts and short- vs. long-termism in corporate policies
(with Sebastian Gryglewicz and Simon Mayer) Working paper EPFL
Dynamic agency model in which the agent controls current earnings via short-term effort and firm growth via long-term effort. Paper shows how firm characteristics shape the horizon of corporate policies, thereby generating a number of novel predictions on the optimality of short- vs- long-termism.
Short-term debt and incentives for risk-taking
(with Marco Della Seta and Francesca Zucchi) Working paper EPFL
Challenges the view that short-term debt financing curbs moral hazard and shows that, in a world with financing frictions, short-term debt increases incentives for risk-taking.
Transitory versus permanent shocks: Explaining corporate savings and investment
(with Sebastian Gryglewicz, Loriano Mancini, Enrique Schroth, and Philip Valta) Working paper EPFL
Corporate savings and investment are better understood when recognizing the separate effects of permanent and transitory shocks in cash flow risk.